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Abstract 
Recent research on information technology (IT) value has focused on examining new theoretical 
bases from which to construct robust valuation methods and models. This paper considers two 
literatures which previously have not been explored in this context: research on behavioral 
decision making and information presentation effects. We begin by identifying a typology of 
potential cognitive biases and heuristics which may enhance or suppress IT value when 
workstations are used to provide decision support. To illustrate, we examine how these effects 
may become operative in screen-based securities and foreign exchange trading activities, where 
designers can choose among information presentation formats which support trader decision 
making. We adapt a recent model by Kroeck, t<irs and Fiedler ( I  989) to identify where and how 
information effects, heuristics and biases come into play in the trading environment. Our 
investigation concludes that managerial recognition of the potential value tradeoffs associated 
with alternative trading workstation window designs is an important concern for fine-tuning 
trading decision support systems. In this way, the "business value linkage" between trading 
workstation investments and the returns they provide can be more fully understood. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent advances in methods to measure the value of information technology (IT) 
investments have focused on identifying ways to represent the context in which value is created 
(Weill, 1988; and Weill and Olson, 1989), and theoretical bases to support business value 
measures. Kauffman and Weill (1989) have argued that it will take new methods and 
approaches from outside standard referent literatures for information systems research to 
make additional progress towards solving some of the more difficult measurement: problems. 
Some of the areas they suggested were marketing science, game theory in microeconomics, 
decision theory and cognitive psychology. In addition, Bakos (1987) and Crowston and Treacy 
(1986) have called for an investigation of transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975) and a 
variety of approaches from organizational theory. Each of the areas provides a theoretical basis 
which is worthwhile exploring to determine its applicability for formulating robust measures 
for the value of IT. 
Having a theoretical basis to guide measure selection is important for several reasons. 
First, using measures which have some basis in theory enables a manager to construct what 
Swanson (1989) has called a "justificatory argument." This is the reasoning behind the 
measure or system of measures which conveys how IT deployment influences the value of the 
firm. Unless managers have a clear picture of the ways in which IT affects a firm's 
performance, it is highly unlikely that the right things will be measured. Second, measures 
based in theory lend themselves to testing whether the proposed impacts of IT are actually 
occurring. This is a key concern when many of the impacts an IT creates are "soft", and thus not 
easily quantified. Knowing whether an impact is occurring at all is a more basic concern than 
knowing how much value is being created. Third, theory-based business value measures also 
make it possible for other researchers to validate results across contexts. 
1 .l. Behavioral Decision Research and Business Value Measurement at the lnforrnation System 
Level 
In this paper we focus on the measurement of value created at the individual or 
information system level (Bakos, 1987) from the perspective of an as yet unexplored theory 
base for the creation and testing of 'business value linkages' for IT: behavioral decision 
research, This unit of analysis is the least likely to suffer from "dilution" that makes 
identifying the marginal contribution of IT difficult (Kauffman and Weill, 1989). But still 
there are some difficult measurement problems. Some IT valuation problems we have 
considered include a microcomputer on a corporate treasurer's desk, changes in the inquiry 
processing capability of a funds transfer system, and trading workstations in Wall Street money 
market operations. System outputs at this level rarely can be quantified in dollars and cents 
terms. Though tangible outputs may be easily identified, it may not be clear how they map into 
operating cost reduction or revenue enhancement. On the other hand, in each of the examples it 
is easy to cite decisions that rely on tangible system outputs. 
Consider the following quote from a money market trader who relies on a 
workstation-based information system to provide important information about the markets in 
which he trades. 
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'Xrbitrarily we can say that there are five types of  markets, meaning from a 
very slow market to a very fast, or directional one. Market Type One is a very 
slow, or nondirectional, market, and Type Five is a very fast directional kind of 
market. ... The idea is  that i f  I'm in a Type Five Market right now, I don't want 
al l  the Type One days of  the past seven years to influence my signal for 
tomorrow. I would prefer that they be excluded from the decision making 
process. I would want included in the decision making process only the other 
Type Five days. ... In essence, each day is given a number based on the type of 
day it is  considered to be, and then a research process is  run over each 
parameter so that each evening, 1 can get the signals for the next day." (Aren, 
1989, p. 71.) 
Behavioral decision research (BDR) and experiments on information presentation, whose 
important results we will examine in some detail shortly, represent interesting literatures to 
explore for their relevance to measuring IT value at the individual or system level for several 
reasons. First, using BDR can help to focus the justificatory argument on the ways in which the 
system is likely to influence decisions which have economic content. In a funds transfer inquiry 
subsystem, for example, inquiry specialists rely entirely on information presented by the 
system to make judgments about how to correct apparent errors. Correcting a faulty 
transaction has direct economic consequences, since a bank must recompense the customer made 
from the value of unavailable funds during the period the error ensues. Using the information 
provided by the system often involves inferences by the inquiry specialist, based on the 
presentation of information in fixed screen-based formats. The formats may be ideal for 
handling some inquiries but poor for others. 
Second, since measures for usage or user satisfaction may have very little in common with 
value created in each of the cases we discussed above, BDR can be used to suggest the direction 
and strength of potential effects of different information display designs, assuming that some 
usage occurs. This assumption is not a strong one; it suggests that the information would have 
an impact some of the time on some decisions. (For additional perspective on this argument, see 
Banker, Kauffman and Morey (1989).) A third aspect of its potential usefulness is the set of 
experimental approaches associated with models to describe human decision making in the 
presence of different information displays. Although we are still exploring these ideas, we feel 
that what has been learned in the experimental literatures on BDR and information presentation 
eifects can be used to suggest how business value measures for IT might be constructed. 
Several recent papers have argued for measuring value where it occurs, more or less as a 
direct output (Bakos, 1987; Barua, Kriebel and Mukhophadhayay, 1989; and Kauffman, Ghosh 
and Bansal, 1989). This requires the analyst to very carefully specify the manner in which IT 
affects intermediate production within the firm. At the system level, the local context of 
measurement is ail important. The basic questions include: 
What are the relevant local production or decision processes which are influenced by 
the IT, and how are they characterized? 
How are the direct physical outputs of the IT used? 
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What are the relevant measures to track that measure value? 
Is some threshold level of system usage a prerequisite for the creation of value? 
What are the contextual factors moderating IT value, and how are they to be 
represented? 
1.2. Relevance to Methods for IT Value Measurement 
Dealing with the concerns stated above is central !o making progress on specific IT 
measurement problems. Substantial efforts have been made in the last several years to attempt 
to address some of the issues. The trend we see developing is toward more careful treatment of 
less direct, hard to quantify impacts. Berger (1988) and Banker and Kauffman (1988b) 
suggested typologies for the kinds of outputs which IT creates. Swanson (1988) argued that 
measurement is only part of the picture: what must support a measurement scheme is a solid 
foundation of reasoning. This enables managers to understand, interpret and take meaningful 
actions based on measures for IT value. Kaplan (1 985) stated that the most valuable impacts of 
a technology (he considered computer integrated manufacturing) are often hidden from current 
management accounting measurement methods. Kriebel (1 989) and Kauffman and Kriebel 
(1988a) made a similar case for generalized investment in IT in the firm, suggesting that 
methods from microeconomics will prove helpful in gauging the strategic value of IT. 
More recent work we have been conducting in this  area has focused on econometric 
testing of business value linkages for IT (Kauffman, 1988; Kauffman and Kriebel, 1988b). 
Identifying business value linkages for IT puts an emphasis on the process of production which 
leads to the creation of value. Banker and Kauffman (1989), for example, developed a market 
share model which estimated how the value of automated teller machine deployment changed 
when bank branches operated under different competitive conditions. Other research has 
suggested that IT value research has failed to properly treat the context of production influenced 
by IT. Weill and Olson (1989) recognized that organizational factors can enhance or suppress a 
firm's ability to convert IT investment into outputs such as cost reductions and sales increases. 
Kauffman, Ghosh and Bansal (1989) took a similar perspective, suggesting that demographic 
factors in a firm's competitive environment also need to be explicitly incorporated into models 
which validate the business value linkage for IT. Banker, Kauffman and Morey (1989) 
supplemented these views by observing that IT, as a secondary factor of production, is likely to 
have probabilistic impacts on productive efficiency. They provided a methodology to incorporate 
this kind of information explicitly into a testable model which focuses on input resource costs. 
Thus, the relevance of the BDR and information presentation literature to research work on IT 
value is the potential they hold for opening up new ways to validate a business value linkage for 
IT in environments where information display design influences management decision. 
1.3. Outline of Paper 
Section 2 examines results found in the empirical literature on behavioral decision 
research and information presentation effects in order to clearly frame the aspects we think are 
relevant to IT valuation. Section 3 illustrates our approach using trading workstation 
information display design in the money or securities market operations of a financial firm. We 
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present a description of real-time trader workstation technology, the environment in which 
they are deployed, and the kinds of information they present. We go on to suggest a potential 
business value linkage, based on a model by Kroeck, Kirs and Fiedler (1989). In Section 4 we 
present a typology of impacts and ways in which information displays may affect the 
risklreward trade-offs perceived by traders. We also discllss how this may affect the positions 
they create and their trading performance, and discuss how it could be tested experimentally. 
Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of some issues that still need to explored more 
carefully in further research before this approach will yield interesting empirical results for 
the business value of trading workstations. 
2. Behavioral Decision Research, Information Presentation Effects and IT Value 
2.1. Behavioral Decision Research 
The heuristics and biases proposed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1977; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) which characterize much of 
behavioral decision research help explain many situations in which individuals appear to make 
irrational choices. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) provides a rigorous base 
for much of this work when it proposes a two-stage decision process. In the first phase acts, 
outcomes, and contingencies of the decision are "edited", or mapped into subjective views of the 
decision maker with attendant subjective values and probabilities. Prospect theory goes on to 
describe the relationships which make up this mapping process. The second phase of the 
decision process is the evaluation of these framed alternatives. 
The act of editing can introduce a number of biases. For example, individuals have been 
shown to be risk seeking when they perceive themselves to be operating from a base of losses 
and risk averse when operating from a base of gains. This is also referred to as framing bias. 
The hindsight bias has also been investigated (Fischhoff, 1975). This occurs when individuals 
systematically overestimate their ex ante predictions when asked to recall them after an 
accurate forecast. Following an incorrect forecast subjects often underestimate their earlier 
predictions. This bias alters the weighting scheme a decision maker uses when evaluating 
information about prior outcomes. 
Behavioral decision research attempts to understand decision processes by inducing 
inconsistencies in the decision outcome through the manipulation of the information provided to 
the decision maker. Specific outcomes are then used to imply particular cognitive processes. 
Preference reversals are the most common inconsistency studied (Johnson, Payne and Bettman, 
1988). They occur when preferences are elicited using two different presentations of the same 
information, and the individual exhibits different preferences in each case. Alternatively, the 
individual's preference may be solicited in two different response modes, such as in terms of 
rankings versus willingness to pay. Again, a preference reversal is indicated if the subject 
makes different choices in each mode. 
Although the influence of decision biases on individual performance has been considered 
experimentally, none has considered the economic impacts of decision biases at the business unit 
level. Moreover, few attempts have been made to systematically gauge the overall impact of 
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decision biases in terms of the economic impact on the organization. 
2.2. Presentation Effects Literature 
Much of the research on the effect of presentation manipulations has compared tabular 
with graphic presentations (e.g., Dickson, Senn, and C h e ~ a n y ,  1977; Remus, 1984). This 
body of literature generally is characterized by a great deal of inconsistencies in results. 
Jarvenpaa. Dickson, and DeSanctis (1985) have suggested that many of the inconsistencies are 
due to lack of precision in the definition of variables and the absence of a systematic 
investigation of the task dependencies in the use of graphs. Several researchers, such as Bell 
(1984), have reported on experiments which indicated that the preferred form of information 
display is task dependant. This conclusion F~llows from earlier experimental results (e.g., 
Dickson, Senn and Chervany, 1977) indicating that tables support more accurate decisions, 
while graphs support more rapid decisions. 
Vessey (1 988) also presented evidence that suggests that the contextual characteristic 
which defines the performance of graphs versus tables is the match between the extent of the 
"SPATIAL-NESS" or "SYMBOLIC-NESS" of the information presented and that of the task at hand. 
This conclusion focuses attention on information processing. It implies that there are better and 
worse ways of processing specific decisions, and information presentation can be tailored to suit 
particular decision processes. Huber (1 980) conducted a series of experiments which supports 
this conclusion. His study indicated that individuals who were presented with verbal 
information used decision strategies which did not require mental arithmetic. The subjects in 
Huber's experirnent allowed their decision processing strategy to be determined by the 
presentation of the information rather than by the problem at hand. 
Johnson, Payne and Bettman (1988) investigated shifts in cognitive processes as the 
complexity of the information presented changed. By presenting data in simple fractions, more 
complex fractions and decimals they induced different frequencies of preference reversals by 
the participants. Using process tracing techniques they observed that decision makers moved 
from alternative-based, axpectation type evaluation strategies to more attribute-based, or 
heur'istic strategies, as complexity increased. Alternative-based strategies are generally more 
accurate, but require more cognitive effort for equivalent tasks. 
Other studies have broadened the idea of presentation effects in various ways. The 
influence of the amount of information available in risk perception tasks was investigated by 
Levin, Johnson, Russo and Deldin (1985). They examined the influence of the number of 
attributes of the stimulus on incidence of framing in three different tasks, focusing on 
inferences decision makers make in the absence of complete information. Johnson and Tversky 
(1984) investigated the influence of the representation of risk on the relative ranking of risk. 
They found that the ranking of various risks differed according to the ways in which the 
participants in the study evaluated the risks (i.e., by comparison of similarity and prediction or 
by dimensional evaluation). This study also showed that decision strategy influences the 
outcome of the decision process even when contingencies are materially the same. The effect of 
grouping information on decision making was investigated by Behling, Gifford and Tolliver 
(1 980). They argued that decision makers manipulate categories rather than calculate precise 
values. By implication, it is possible to influence the outcome of decisions by grouping 
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alternatives together. 
The various sources of bias and altered decision processing outlined in this section have 
been investigated primarily in laboratory settings, although some researchers have tried to 
develop a degree of realism in their experiments. For example Puto (1985) utilized 
professionals in scenarios similar to those encountered in their daily work. However, no study 
appears to have considered the systems actually used in the workplace and the biases which may 
be encountered in that context. 
We turn next to a discussion of trader workstations'and the financial decision making 
context which occurs in money and securities market trading operations. The type of decisions 
encountered and the conditions under which they are made clearly influences the impact 
information systems can have on the process and the biasing effect the use of heuristics and 
presentation styles may have. We will discuss how some of the biases we have described may 
become operative intrading and other financial decision making settings and also consider 
specific biases which may influence the quality of decisions supported by trading workstations. 
3. A Business Value Linkage for Trader Workstation Performance Evaluation 
The need for information is of paramount importance for firms which are serious 
players in the securities and money market trading business. Robert M. Mark and Steven N. 
Roth, experienced senior managers with responsibilities for technology applkations in 
securities and money market trading operations of large New York City-based financial firms, 
have recently noted that: 
"... [to] anyone who has thought about or invested in stocks, bonds, 
futures,opfions, or commodifies, it is clear that accurate, timely information is 
the prime imperative in making investment decisions. To those who trade in the 
pits on a trading floor (such as the New York Stock Exchange) or in a dealing room 
(where most large financial institutions do their trading), the timeliness of 
market information is critical. To a trader, such as an arbitrageur, who scans a 
reasonably large cross section of a financial market, automated assistance has 
become an absolute necessity." (Mark and Roth, 1989) 
3.1. Technology 
Mark and Roth have identified several kinds of data which are essential in capital 
markets operations: updated raw prices of instruments and currencies, interest rates in 
regional and international markets, yields of specific instruments, and market news. These data 
are transformed into useful information for traders when they are assembled into scannable 
formats, plugged into analytic models which estimate fair-market price trajectories and create 
yield curves, and presented on an as-demanded basis via a workstation designed to support 
trading operations. 
Today's "real-time" trader workstations support trading in both international and 
domestic markets. High-powered engineering workstations and 286 and 386-based personal 
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computers provide the user interfaces, and engineering workstations and vector processors 
operating behind the scenes are used to provide rapid data manipulation capabilities and the raw 
horsepower for the analytics which help traders make more profitable trades. In addition to the 
real-time information provided, traders have on-line access to a variety of historical data 
related to instruments, currencies and firms which are also useful in arriving at predictions 
about the expected profitability of a specific transaction. 
Much of this information is normally presented in standardized "page formats". Firms 
such as Telerate, KnighVRidder, PC Quote and CQI Comstock consolidate data they obtain in 
digital form from exchange tickers and the news media, and then convert them into the standard 
formats. An example of a Telerate 80-column page form6t is shown below in Figure 1 .  (The 
interested reader should see Mark and Roth (1 989), for additional details). 
Figure I. Telerate Standard Page Format (from Mark and Roth, 1989) 
11/18 14:43EST [U.S. TREASURY AND MONEY MARKETS PAGE 5 
FEDERALFUNDS 14.42 / T-BILL 14.42 YIELD IEURO$DEP 14.35 / QC>V RP 13.23 
BID 6 1 1 2  OPN 6 1 1 2  1*3M 5.78-76 - . I 0  5.943 1 7  318 - 112 1 O/N 6.30-20 
ASK 6 1 12  HSI 6 1 12  1 *6M 6.27-25 - . 02  6.561 1 7 7/16 - 9/16 1 IWK 6.65-45 
LST 6 1 1 2  LOW 6 1 1 4  1 IYR 6.54-52 - . 04  6.956 / 7 13/16 -1 311 6 1 2WK 6.65-45 
FUNDS SOURCE: G. CUYBUTLER 1 "CHANGE FROM AUCTION / I IMO 6.70-60 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - A - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
TREAS CPNS NY EST 14.42 YIELD / CD-BID 14.40 / BAS-BID 14.40 
07.875 10189 100.08-12 +01 7.660 1 /EARLY /LATE / EARLY j LATE 
08.000 1 1 190 99.31-03 UNC 7.964 / DK: / 6.82 -03 1 6.82 -03 1 6.75 -05 1 6.75 -05 
08.125 0 9 / 9 1  102.29-01 UNC 8.192 1 JAN j 7.20 -10 1 7.20 -10 1 7.10 -02 1 7.10 -02 
08.375 1 1 192  99.31-03 UNC 8.352 1 FEB 1 7.20 -05 1 7.20 -05 1 7.1 0 -02 1 7.1 0 -02 
08.500 10194 104.08-12 +04 8.643 1 MAR 1 7.25 -10 1 7.25 -10 1 7.10 -05 1 7.10 -05 
08.875 1 1  197 100.06-10 +01 8.827 1 APR 1 7.30 -10 1 7.30 -10 / 7.10 -05 1 7.10 -05 
09.375 0 2 / 0 6  102.1 6-20 - 0 3  9.075 / MAY 1 7.30 -15 1 7.30 -15 1 7.10 -02 1 7.10 -02 
09.250 0 2 / 1 6  102.08-12 - 0 4  9.014 /DEALERCOMMLPAPEROFFER12.05 1 BANK RATES 
08.750 05/17 97.15-19 - 0 3  8.984 1 3 0  6.74 90 7.12 1 8 0  7.12 IPRlME 8 .75  
08.875 0811 7 99.10-14 - 0 1  8.922 1 6 0  7.09 1 2 0  7.12 2 4 0  7 .12  IBROKffi 8.00  
Other firms re-package this data into products for the trading floor which provide 
traders with access to multiple kinds of consolidated data formats. Some trading houses have 
taken the lead in designing their own value-added real-time trading systems, in order to 
customize the formats of data presented to traders and even to allow traders to construct their 
own unique screens. Microsoft Windows-based trading support applications, for example, are 
becoming increasingly popular. They enable traders to access various levels of detail via pull 
down menus, while other portions of the window are only momentarily covered, but not lost. 
3.2. Valuation Context 
A brief examination of such widely read money-market trading industry publications as 
Computers in Banking and Wall Street Computer Review is useful to gain additional perspective 
on depth of interest and the scope of technology investments made in trading operations. 
Obviously, information plays a central role, but important and basic questions remain regarding 
its value in both raw, unprocessed form and as it is displayed in value-added formats by 
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workstations. These questions include: 
Since the costs involved in delivering trading workstations can be readily determined, 
how can we estimate what the benefits of such a system are in order to arrive at a 
measure for lheir value? 
What is the value of flexibility in presenting information on a trading workstation 
window? 
Given that alternatives exist, how would one know whether a given presentation of 
information is likely to be more or less valuable in supporting a particular kind of 
trading? 
How does a specific mode of information presentation affect a trader's decisions (if  at 
all) and do the effects lead to more profitable trading? 
Traditional IT value analysis might lead to selecting the department a s  the unit of 
analysis; broadly speaking, workstation impacts must be confined to the trading area. And, since 
money market trading operations are profit centers, it is likely that a range of candidate 
measures would be available. There is a problem, however: choosing the trading area, in 
aggregate, a s  the unit of analysis creates the potential for dilution of impact. Instead of directly 
impacting the area as  a whole, it is probably more accurate to argue that the information a 
trader workstation can provide (given the design trade-offs implicii in choosing the final bundle 
of screen-based information) influences a trader's perception of risk and reward. This 
probably only happens some of time, because the information presented by the workstation is 
not the only factor driving a trader's decision. If this information can be represented in the IT 
valuation methodology, then we would expect the measures of performance we collect, on 
average, to be less biased. 
We now turn  to a more detailed consideration of how trader workstations fit into a model 
of decision making in trading environments. 
3.3.  Modeling the Influence of Information Presentation on Trader Decisions 
One of the primary difficulties associated with evaluating trader workstation window 
design alternatives is that much of what occurs as  "decision making" (and the influences which 
drive it) is not directly obsewable to an analyst. What an analyst would recognize, however, is 
that some decisions require culling the information available in the entire market and trading 
floor environment. On the other hand, arbitrage opportunities can be identified algorthmically, 
or by traders scanning information reported in a trader workstation window or by telephone. 
These trading decisions require the trader to do little more than identify that a situation exists, 
and do not require much processing of other information related to the past or an uncertain 
future. 
Other decisions require synthesizing varied amounts of information. Some information 
is reported on a screen; some becomes available only a s  groups of traders test the market with 
transactions. In these cases, there is only a chance that the introduction of information 
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technology in the decision process will effect some change in the decision. In Figure 2 below, we 
present a model adapted from Kroeck, Kirs and Fiedler (1989), which describes how 
information is used in a trader's decision processes. News from the market comes in two forms: 
as unprocessed data and as processed information. 
Figure 2. Sketch of Information Use and Effects ir, a Trading Environment 





LlNK #O - Retrieval of Unprocessed lnformation from Trading Floor and Market 
LINK #I - Data Filtering and Setup, with Selected Analytics 
LlNK #2 - Workstation lnformation Incorporated into Trader's ~ e c i s i o n  Process 
LINK #3 - Appearance of Trader Biases and Heuristics Based on Info Presented 
LlNK #4 - Trading Decision Outcome 
LlNK #5 - Market Context of Trading Decisions 
LlNK #6 - Evaluation of Trader's Decision in Terms of Market Opportunities 
Note: This figure is adapted from a more general model for the cognitive analysis of information presented 
in Kroeck, Kirs and Fiedler (1989). 
1 
Cr) 
This model is useful to understand the trading decision process and the role of trader 
workstations for several reasons. First, it explicitly captures the idea that workstations do not 
provide the only source of information. Traders gather information from the market, from 
newspapers and other print sources, and from other traders as well (L!NK #O). Traders also 
make use of information which has been filtered, analyzed and set up by trading floor automation 
4 
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(LINK #I) ,  and then presented in workstation windows (LINK #2). Depending on the nature of 
the trading decision, traders may choose to ignore LlNK #1 and LlNK #2, and focus instead on 
getting "a feel for the market". 
At some point, the trader's focus will shift from the gathering to synthesizing 
information towards identifying a trading opportunity or making a final decision. When this 
occurs a limited set of "informational characteristics" will be selected by the trader. This 
information should be task-relevant, but what is actually available for processing by the trader 
is limited by the firm's trading automation (LINK # I )  and the screen-based presentation of 
information. 
Since each trader has individual heuristics which embody the expertise that leads to 
successful trading, not all traders agree on what information is relevant in deciding on a specific 
trade opportunity. Moreover, the potential for biases to affect trading decisions also arises 
here, since (in most cases) individual traders have little control over how even basic 
information is presented. In fact, discussions we have had with trading automation executives at 
major New York City commercial and investment banks suggest that trading workstation 
windows are designed with the "average trader" engaged in a specific kind of trading (e.g., 
mortgage-backed securities, foreign exchange, and derivative instruments) in mind. 
Once a trader reaches a tentative decision (LINK #4), it will be compared with current 
events and new information available from the market and the workstation to ensure that it is 
still an appropriate move in the ever-changing market context (LINK #5). After the trade is 
made, the profitability of the trade can be determined using standard evaluation methods 
available in the industry (LINK #6). 
The model we suggest is also useful as a "business value linkage" for trader workstations. 
It helps to identify the key elements which combine to produce valuable decisions for the firm: 
the market, the information system which provides update-s on the market, analytics to gauge 
how a trader should react in the current market, the trader himself and a measurement system 
which audits the quality of the trades he makes. While the business value linkage does not 
directly suggest a means to gauge the value of the workstation in the trading process, it helps to 
make the case that measurement can occur at the level of the trader. We next consider how 
workstation value may vary in terms of information presentation choices and the biases that 
may go along with them. 
4. Dimensions of Bias Applied to Trading in Financial Markets 
The trading environments we have described manifest a set of characteristics which 
make particular heuristics more likely to be used in decision processing. The availability of 
information, timing of decisions and sophistication of the decision makers all influence the way 
information is used. Although we believe that promising opportunities exist to conduct research 
into information presentation effects in simulated trading experiments, due to space limitations 
we concentrate on biases and heuristics suggested in BDR only. Although we expect that 
presentation effects can also bias financial decision making, the field of BDR, through its 
theoretical development, provides us with a more generalizable theoretical framework with 
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which to initially attack the domain of trading decisions. 
In Table 1 below, we present an overview of seven heuristics and suggest ways in which 
they may become operative in financial decision making. These seven heuristics are not intended 
to be an exhaustive list; they were culled from a number of sources, including Kroeck, Kirs, 
and Fiedler (1989). Behavioral decision research has provided an abundance of evidence that 
the use of these heuristics in decision making leads to biases in the decision process, and we 
anticipate that each of these biases will have an impact on financial decision making. 
A decision maker is often called upon to make a comparison of a current situation with 
previous events in order to judge the relative likelihood of various outcomes. The availability 
heuristic suggests that the decision maker judges the frequency of previous events based on the 
relative ease of recall of these events. Those more easily recalled are judged to be more 
probable. The difficulty of recall is closely related to the saliance of the event, that is, the 
extent to which it sticks out compared to other events. Biases in decision making occur when the 
salience of prior events is not related to their frequency. 
Salience may be influenced by the impact previous events had on a trader's portfolio. In 
this situation a particularly positive event may be recalled relatively easily and assigned a 
probability of recurrence beyond its actual probability. For examle, a trader may have been 
particularly successful (and lucky) taking a position in an initial public offering by a firm in 
an up and coming industry. When another new issue becomes available in that industry, the 
trader may recallhis own prior success and not the many failures that have also occurred. The 
position resulting from this evaluation will be more risky than the position attained through 
trading on the basis of a more objective reckoning of previous information. 
Anchoring and adjustment describes a heuristic used to make estimates when some pcint 
away from the point to be estimated is known. Decision makers tend to make evaluations in this 
situation by starting at the known point, the anchor, and adjusting to reflect the current 
situation. This method has been shown to lead to inaccurate estimates (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). When the adjustment is made upward the estimate is often low, and when the 
adjustment from the anchor is down, the estimate is high. 
A risk manager, whose responsibility it is to set levels of exposure for vsrious 
porfolios, may begin by taking last year's risk levels and adjusting for expectations of market 
volatility. This tactic may be appropriate if market conditions for the instruments making up 
the portfolio reflect the average market conditions. However, i f  the market differs, the risk 
manager will end up either overexposed or underexposed. 
A foreign exchange trader may also use the anchoring heuristic when evaluating 
appropriate trigger points in upward and downward price trends. If the price of a foreign 
currency is trending upwards in relation to the U.S. dollar the trader may anchor off a price 
lower than the price at which the most profitable trade could be made in the present market 
conditions. If the price of the currency is on a downward trend, the trade will probably be made 
at a higher price than otherwise. 
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Table 1. Seven Biases and Their Potential lmpact on Workstation Value 
Bias Description Measurement Context1 Economic Impact of Bias on 
O~erative Bias Workstation Value 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Availability Ease of recall of FX Trading: Overestimate probability Chance of nonrational choice based 
event or info that recent movements recur on overestimation of probabilities 
affects judgment 
of frequency Portfolio Management: develop too Return variance could lead 
risky a portfolio position to unexpected loss levels 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Anchoring & Prediction by Fin. Planning: Planned growth based on Overlunderestimate if 
Adjustment anchoring on a current year's growth, not on potential current year was high or low 
value and 
adjusting growth Purchase Decision Making: Price Quoted price unacceptable or 
depending on offered or accepted based on last below market value 
present case auction, not on current market 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Represen- Likelihood of event Financial Planning: Takeover likelihood Strategic threats unanticipated, 
tativeness judged on similarity judged on industry norm, not specific firm opportunities missed 
of event to class 
of events, not Stock Trading: buys decided Average firms in industry over- 
specific event on industry basis, not firm basis rated, better firms underrated 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Selective Information search Stock Trading: Expectation of Loss of arbitrage 
Perception and rentention movement leads to reactive opportunities, excessive 
influenced by prior trades in response to random trading expenses due to 
expectations, tend random moves of the market excess trades 
to reinforce priors 
FX Trading: Start of movement not Loss of arbitrage opportunity, 
recognized if contrary to prior expectation loss in market position 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Concrete Quantifiable, Fin. Evaluation: Perception of management Management given credit for 
Information statistically vivid quality emphasized over market data outcomes due to market forces 
data dominates 
abstract info Stock Trading: Purchases made on Poor choices due 
basis of analysts' briefings, not on to inaccurate information 
evaluation of firm fundamentals 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Frequency Frequency used as Fin. Evaluation: Absolute number of Project risk underestimated, 
as cue to judge successes considered rather than leading to high variance 
strength of ratio of success to attempts in return 
predicted 
relationship Stock Trading: Trading volume used Loss of trading margin, 
as indicator of general trend even if development of undesirable 
price is stable, volume used as position 
indicator of attractiveness of stock 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Regression Outliers used FX Trading: Market calms Faulty attribution leads to 
to indicate a after volatile period, trader incorrect expectation; decision 
growing trend attributes calmer market to not based on regression to the 
threat of govternment intervention mean may be more risky 
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The representativeness heuristic is similar to what is widely known as stereotyping. 
When a decision must be made concerning some event about which not much is known, a decision 
maker will often assume that the event has the same characteristics as some other similar class 
of events about which more is known. This stereotyping leads to the misattribution of 
characteristics when the specific event deviates from others of a similar class. 
A stock broker may be especially optimistic about firms in a particular industry. In 
order to gain some advantage the trader may purchase a quantity of stock in a relatively obscure 
firm from that particular industry without investigating the specific firm adequately. If the 
firm happens to be an above average performer for the industry, the broker may do well. But if 
the firm is below average, the broker will have made a mistake. In either case, the broker's 
decision has been biased by the representative heuristic. 
The representativeness heuristic can also influence the way in which traders perceive 
trends in the market. For this reason, an increasingly popular tool many traders are eager to 
try out is termed a "breakcut system". 
'% breakout system signals irregular market activity that may indicate money 
making trend or a negative direction in the market. Ideally, the broker learns of 
the trend in time to respond appropriately by jumping in or quickly exiting the 
market the system is monitoring." (Aren, 1989, p. 8) 
The basic idea is that an information system provides a means to help the trader decide whether 
the current situation is adequately represented by all the other data monitored in a decision 
process. 
The selective perception of a trader is another mechanism which can lead to biases in 
decision making. An individual's prior expectations about the characteristics of an item 
influence what information is sought out and retained. If a particular stock is thought to be 
especially undervalued based on the fundamentals of a firm's operations, or for any other 
reason, information to the contrary will tend to be filtered out. The basis for the prior 
expectation is not important; its existence is sufficient for the bias to occur. 
If a firm is thought to be in a weak financial condition, a small downward movement in 
price may be interpreted as the start of a downward trend, and reacted to accordingly. If the 
same movement occurred in the price of a strong firm, it would more likely be ignored. About 
the time national economic performance figures are due out a foreign exchange trader may 
already have a set of expectations about what they will be. At this point, if a currency makes a 
small movement, the trader may react according to his expectations, rather than waiting for the 
figures to be released. 
Personal experiences and distinct events are treated as if they are more concrete 
information than statistics compiled on an industry or the market, in general. Anecdotal 
knowledge tends to be easily recalled. The effect is similar to that of the availability heuristic; 
more reliable, though abstract, statistics are passed over in favor of vividly recallable 
personal evidence. For example, an analyst who has attended a private briefing by a firm may 
base her evaluation disproportionately on the information received through that channel as 
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opposed to the analysis of publicly available data Similarly the heroic efforts of a management 
team to turn around a firm may be overemphasized in comparison to the effect of market forces 
on the firm's success. 
Frequency is often inappropriately used as a cue to judge the strength of a relationship. 
The total number of occurrences is not necessarily an indicator of a strong relationship. For 
example, an investment firm may be evaluated on the basis of deals completed without regard to 
the total number of deals initiated. The firm may be three times as large as another investment 
firm but complete only twice as many deals, so the firm may not be more efficient. The ratio of 
successes to attempts is a more relevant measure of competence. 
Another way in which frequency may be misused as a signal occurs in trading. A high 
volume of trading in a particular issue may be interpreted as an indication of attractiveness. 
The volume, however, may simply be the result of a portfolio adjustment by a large 
institutional trader which might not be indicative of the stock's future earnings potential. 
Trading on the basis of the high volume, in this case, would lead to an unintended market position 
in terms of expected profit potential. 
The final of our seven heuristics and biases is regression. This bias results from a 
common misperception of simple statistical variance. Outcomes deviate about some mean in the 
normal course of events. However, data points far from the mean are often attributed to some 
external force. This leads to a misattribution of causality and inappropriate actions on the part 
of the decision maker. For example, if a market calms after being particularly volatile, a 
trader may attribute the calming to some threat of government intervention. Trading on the 
basis of this misperception will lead to position inappropriate for actual market conditions. 
4.2. Capturing Potential Biases: Moderators in the Business Value Linkage 
Traders are willing to utilize information presented by trading workstaiions because 
their experience with it over time suggests that the information possesses predictive ability. In 
general, information on a set of variables related to the performance of a currency or money 
market instrument will be useful if the likelihood functions describing the variables shift in the 
presence of impending increases or decreases in the price of the currency or the money market 
instrument. If the likelihood functions are very similar, the set of variables chosen will 
provide little predictive ability to identify the direction of price movements (Tully, 1987). 
Previous literature in accounting research is very useful to focus in on this problem 
further. Beaver (1968), for example, examined the extent to which financial statement ratios 
enable an analyst to more accurately predict the occurrence of bankruptcy among firms. The 
basic insight provided by the study was that the time lag between the financial ratios used to 
support the prediction and the bankruptcy event itself had to be small for the ratios to provide 
useful information. Tully (1987) argued that this  provides an ideal opportunity to conduct 
experimental research since the dates of the financial ratios can be manipulated by the 
experimenter. 
In fact, we believe that such "experiments" are actually conducted in practice, as money 
market firms deploy trader vl~orkstations with ready-made window design choices. A trader's 
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role is to pursue a strategy of profit maximization (in view of the risks taken) and thus the 
automation which supports the trader should be designed to increase the likelihood of profitable 
trades. Whether this actually occurs is open to question, and most firms are short on empirical 
facts to shed light on this conjecture. The heuristics used by traders are their private 
information, and the biases they exhibit go largely unobserved. Identifying aspects of the value 
of a trader workstation requires an analyst to more fully understand what kinds of decisions it is 
used for, and which aspects of the information presented are utilized. 
In order to capture the impact of the heuristics as moderators in the business value 
linkage for trader workstations, we support designing and conducting laboratory experiments 
that simulate just a portion of the trading process. The relevant portions to capture (holding all 
the other iinks fixed in an experimental design) are LINK #2 (trader identifies relevant data) 
and LINK #3 (trader applies heuristics and may allow bias from information presentation to 
affect decision). Given the difficulties experienced by researchers who have conducted 
experimental work on biases in other contexts, we expect the design of workable experiments 
which shed light on the questions of interest to be challenging. In an experimental setting, to 
determine whether varied information presentations tend to lead to some of the biases discussed 
above in financial decision making contexts would require careful manipuiation of the format so 
that the information content is unaltered. 
Our interest in conducting experiments on window design alternatives is focused on 
determining what kinds of decisions are influenced, and the extent to which less profitable 
trades occur in a relatively controlled environment. From this, we could extrapolate to what is 
actually occurring on the trading floor (probabilistically, at least). The result would be 
estimates of the costs associated with using a given window design alternative to support a 
certain kind of trading. The costs would be "deadweight losses" based on the profitability 
associated with the experimentally ideal trades. We can only infer that a similar process would 
be occurring on the trading floor, but this is no different than what happens with trader 
workstations in practice, day to day. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued for an examination of a new theory base -- behavioral 
decision research -- in order to guide the evaluation of trader workstations in money market 
operations. Our review of the literature on behavioral decision theory, information 
presentation effects and cognitive biases suggests some promising new avenues from which to 
view the problem of developing partial business value est imat~s for this technology. We also 
presented a model, based on the recent work of Kroeck, Kirs and Fiedler (1989), which is 
useful in representing the key elements of the trading decision making process. In addition, we 
observed that this revised model can serve as a business value linkage for trader workstations, 
because it clearly articulates a series of links between the technology, the intermediate decision 
making production process it affects, and the key business value output in trading, profitable 
trades. 
The ideas this paper presents are clearly exploratory. We recognize that considerable 
difficulties will have to be overcome to make the estimation of business value workable using 
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this approach. Nevertheless, we think the approach has promise enough to warrant further 
investigation, but questions remain. 
How can laboratory experiments be conducted to simulate trading to isolate the 
impacts of trader biases and heuristics? 
How might similar experimental methods might be used in a field study of a real trading 
operation? 
Virtually all of the research in the areas of presentation effects and behavioral decision 
research has been done in the laboratory. The stylized scenarios utilized are typically designed 
to yield clear results, often to the disadvantage of realism. Internal validity is emphasized over 
external validity, an understandable, even preferable, approach early in the development of a 
field of study. The observation of subtle influences requires close control of the experimental 
variables until such time that the experimenters know where to look. 
One stream of research has already begun to add realism to the experimental scenario, 
Vessey (1988) examined the context dependency of the impact of presentation effects. Though it 
is not yet part of a practitioner's toolkit, this work contributes an added dimension of 
understanding to the work that has gone before. In general, there are two directions that may be 
pursued to enhance the external validity of experimental work in the laboratory. First, the 
tasks and experimental materials can be made more realistic. The screen displays can be based 
on those in actual use, with the inevitable complexity and extraneous information involved, and 
the trading task can be replicated as completely as possible. It may even be possible to utilize 
actual data as it would have been available to the trader on the floor. In a lab it is impossible to 
recreate a trading environment in its entirety, but at least the task can be made more true-to- 
life. The data yielded by this sort of experiment will necessarily be more complex than that 
obtained through a highly stylized experiment, but it can also yield a great deal more insight if 
the experiment has been well designed. 
A second approach to enhancing external validity is to utilize practitioners in stylized 
experiments. This would allow the experimenter to investigate how the individual interacts 
with their data. When undergraduates or MBA students are used to investigate the behavior of 
traders, at best you would see the behavior of inexperienced traders. If training or experience 
plays a large role in the development of particular decision making strategies, information 
would be lost in an experiment without the involvement of actual trading pros. There has been 
work that has shown that biases persist in experienced decision makers (e.g., McNeil, Pauker, 
Sox and Tversky, 1982), but we feel that once the complexity of the experiment begins to 
approach that encountered in the work environment, the expertise of the practitioner becomes 
necessary to obtain realistic results. 
Ideally, lab experiments at this stage in the development of the field would utilize 
practitioners of various levels of expertise in simulations involving realistic decision 
scenarios. The hub-bub of a trading floor cannot easily be recreated in a laboratory, but the 
realism of the stimuli can still be recreated. 
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